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Machine Protocol Screening Language (MPSL)

Published on September 26, 2025 • Updated September 26, 2025

Policy & Technical Spec


National Security Framework of Antarctica (NSF-A)

1) Purpose & Scope

MPSL is a Python-assisted, supervisor-enforced protocol language for pre-boot screening and OS compatibility attestation of AI agents across next-generation full-stack online operating systems. It governs Robotic Process Automation (RPA) orchestration, coordinates Machine Intelligence Automation (MIA) at the hardware layer, and bridges IoT/offline preservation with cloud services.

This policy defines design goals, trust architecture, runtime model, compliance requirements, and licensing for implementers, OEMs, device operators, and auditors.


2) Design Goals

  1. Pre-Boot Trust: Act before cloud start-up to identify, authenticate, authorise, verify, account, and validate (IAAVAV) the OS, agent stack, and device posture.
  2. Low-Code Control: Declarative syntax with Python assist modules for complex flows, crypto, and device introspection.
  3. Hardware–Cloud Continuity: Continuous attestation from firmware → hypervisor → OS → agent and onward to state rails in the cloud.
  4. Determinism & Auditability: Signed policies, deterministic evaluation, append-only logs.
  5. Resource Safety: Rate limits, timeouts, capability sandboxes for RPA/MIA actions.
  6. Offline Preservation: Graceful degradation and offline enforcement when cloud is unavailable.


3) Trust & Attestation Architecture

Chain of Trust (CO T):

ROM/BootROM → Secure Bootloader → Trustlet (MPSL Supervisor) → Hardware Attestation (TPM/TEE/PCRs) → MPSL Policy (signed) → Drivers/OS Images (hash allowlist) → AI Agents/RPA Manifests → Cloud State (post-boot).

Artifacts & Keys

  1. Device Identity Key (DIK): Burned or provisioned at manufacture; non-exportable.
  2. Platform Attestation Key (PAK): Used by trustlet to sign posture reports.
  3. Policy Signing Key (PSK): NSF-A root → intermediate → vendor/tenant keys.
  4. Audit Log Key (ALK): Rotating, for tamper-evident local logs.

Reports

  1. Pre-Boot Posture (PBP): PCRs, firmware hashes, driver set, OS image digest, agent manifests.
  2. Compatibility Vector (CV): Declared features (GPU class, ISA, sensors, radios), safety gates, export flags.
  3. Decision Token (DT): Permit/deny/degraded with reason codes; bound to boot epoch.


4) Runtime Model

  1. Phase 0 (Provision): Enrol device, install trustlet, bind keys, fetch baseline policy.
  2. Phase 1 (Screen): Evaluate hardware/firmware/OS/agent against MPSL policy; emit DT.
  3. Phase 2 (Enforce): Gate drivers, kernel modules, radios, and agent load based on DT.
  4. Phase 3 (Account): Produce signed audit records, counters, and usage billing hooks.
  5. Phase 4 (Sustain): Live policy updates with staged rollouts and rollback guarantees.


5) Language Overview (Declarative Core + Python Assist)

Core MPSL is declarative: capabilities, matches, gates, and actions. Python Assist offers safe, deterministic helpers (cryptography, parsing, attestation math), executed inside a supervisor sandbox.

Primitive Concepts

  1. capability: named feature the OS/agent requests (e.g., gpu.tensor, radio.satcom).
  2. evidence: measured value (hash, PCR, SPDM, ACPI, SMBIOS, firmware id).
  3. gate: boolean rule; can call a whitelisted Python helper.
  4. action: permit, deny, degrade, quarantine, rotate_keys, wipe_sensitive.
  5. profile: bundle of gates + actions for a class of devices/sites.
  6. bind: attach profiles to device classes, tenants, or geofences.

Minimal Example (illustrative)

policy "nsfa.os.screening.v1" {
require evidence.os.image_hash in allowlist("os_images_v1");
require evidence.gpu.class >= "sm_80";
require evidence.firmware.secure_boot == true;

gate "agent_whitelist" when agent.manifest.hash in allowlist("agents") else deny;

# RPA/MIA permissions
capability "gpu.tensor" permit if gate("agent_whitelist");
capability "radio.satcom" deny unless evidence.radio.vendor in ["NSFA-SAT-01"];

on fail(any) { action quarantine; log reason; }
on pass { action permit; emit decision_token; }
}

Python Assist (safe helper, concept)

# executed in a constrained sandbox by the MPSL supervisor
def allowlist(name: str) -> set[str]:
# loads a signed, cached set; validated against PSK
return load_signed_set(name)


6) Security Controls

  1. Supervisor Isolation: Trustlet runs in TEE/secure world; separate address space from OS.
  2. Deterministic Evaluation: No unbounded loops, no network I/O during decision; helpers are pure or use signed caches.
  3. Policy Integrity: Versioned, signed; break-glass key paths require quorum and are fully logged.
  4. Secrets Hygiene: No raw secret exposure; use sealed storage and session handles.
  5. RPA/MIA Sandboxing: Capability scoping; hardware and API call budgets; time-boxed tasks; mandatory idempotency where applicable.
  6. Anti-Rollback: Monotonic counters for firmware and policy epochs.


7) Compatibility Screening & OS Validation

MPSL validates:

  1. Firmware: Boot chain measurements, secure boot flags, revocation lists.
  2. Kernel/Drivers: Hash allowlists; forbidden modules; DMA/IO-MMU posture.
  3. AI Agents: Signatures, manifests, model cards, dataset provenance tags.
  4. Peripherals/IoT: Sensor/radio whitelists, serial and ECC checks, SELinux/AppArmor intent.
  5. Export/Zone Flags: Disables features by geofence (e.g., E1–E3 environmental zones).
  6. Offline Mode: If cloud is down, degraded permit with local fences and escrowed logs.


8) RPA Orchestration & Machine Intelligence Automation (MIA)

  1. RPA Intents: Declarative tasks mapped to capabilities; human-in-the-loop where marked.
  2. MIA Bridge: Safe driver calls for motion, power, sensors; physics & safety interlocks evaluated in supervisor space.
  3. Change Control: New intents require policy update and staged rollout.


9) Logging, Accounting, and Evidence

  1. Local Ledger: Append-only, signed with ALK; export on schedule or upon reconnect.
  2. Cloud Mirrors: Post-boot, DT and posture replicate to state rails; privacy-preserving aggregation for fleet health.
  3. Forensics: Golden image rehydrate, evidence replay, and hash-timeline verification.


10) Compliance & Licensing (NSF-A DCF)

  1. Domestic Compliance Only: MPSL implementations must comply with NSF-A Domestic Compliance Framework; foreign/international certificates are not substitutes.
  2. Licences:
  3. Digital Infrastructure Licence (DIL) for trustlets, attestation services.
  4. Commercial Science Licence (CSL) for negotiations (L3 baseline; Bachelor for >£75k; Advanced for >£3m).
  5. CPD/CPE: Roles maintaining MPSL must log ≥18 hours/month of competence development.
  6. Audits: Code escrow, reproducible builds, red-team attestations, supply-chain SBOMs.


11) Governance & Lifecycle

  1. Semantic Versioning: MPSL x.y.z with backwards-compatible guardrails.
  2. LTS Channels: Security-only backports for LTS; feature in current channel.
  3. Deprecation Windows: Minimum 18 months for opcode/gate removals.
  4. Emergency Revocation: PSK/allowlist revocation with tenant-safe drains and auto-rollback.


12) Example Profiles (Conceptual)

Edge-HPC with GPU Inference

profile "edge.hpc.v1" {
require capability "gpu.tensor";
require evidence.gpu.vram_ecc == true;
gate "model_ok" when agent.model.card.sri in allowlist("medical_imaging_models");
capability "gpu.tensor" permit if gate("model_ok");
on pass { permit }
on fail { degrade cpu_only; report }
}

Cold-Zone IoT Sensor Hub (Offline-First)

profile "iot.coldzone.v1" {
require evidence.radio.vendor in ["NSFA-LO", "NSFA-UHF"];
capability "radio.cellular" deny; # radio hard-off in E2/E3
allow offline_window = 72h;
on cloud_unreachable { degrade; escrow_logs; rotate_keys_if_needed; }
}


13) Implementation Guidance

  1. Reference Trustlet: TEE-targeted (ARM TrustZone/TDX/SEV-SNP variants); reproducible build toolchain.
  2. Policy Tooling: Signed policy packs; CI validating determinism and helper purity; fuzzing for gate combinations.
  3. OEM Integration: Secure element binding; SPDM/DT attestation paths; driver gating hooks.
  4. Developer Kits: Emulators, virtual TPM, synthetic evidence generators, and red-team harnesses.


14) Prohibited Practices

  1. Network-dependent decisions during pre-boot screening.
  2. Unsandboxed Python or dynamic code import in helpers.
  3. Bypassing supervisor through unsigned kernels or debug fuses in production.
  4. Substituting foreign certifications for DCF licences.


15) Contacts

  1. Standards & Reference Implementations: mpsl@nsf-antarctica.org
  2. Licensing (DIL/CSL): licensing@nsf-antarctica.org
  3. Compliance & Audits: compliance@nsf-antarctica.org
  4. Security Incidents: cert@nsf-antarctica.org


MPSL is a policy-controlled specification. This document is informational and non-exhaustive; implementation requires the appropriate NSF-A licences, audits, and adherence to the DCF.


Version 1.0 • Effective 26 September 2025

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